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Representation is having a moment. It has been said variously that we
have a president who “represents” his base rather than the country as a
whole;1 senators and congressmen who “represent” special interests rather
than their constituents;2 a Supreme Court that “represents” the ideological
views of one party or another;3 and leaders who do not “represent” the
* JD candidate, University of St. Thomas School of Law; B.A. Berea College. The author
would like to dedicate this note to his amazing wife, Theresa, without whom his life and work
would be infinitely impoverished. Special thanks to mentors, Professors Robert J. Delahunty,
Mitchell Gordon, and Michael Robak for all of their support, encouragement, and wisdom during
his time at St. Thomas.
1. Ronald Brownstein, Trump Isn’t Even Trying to Convince Voters on the Shutdown,
ATLANTIC (Jan. 17, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/01/trump-ignoring-
voter-opinion-his-shutdown-fight/580687.
2. Cody Nelson, Minnesota Congresswoman Ignites Debate on Israel and Anti-Semitism,
NPR (Mar. 7, 2019, 12:47 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/03/07/700901834/minnesota-congress
woman-ignites-debate-on-israel-and-anti-semitism (implying that Republican politicians are
influenced by political lobbying groups to vote in Israel’s interests); Democratic Representation:
Americans’ Frustration with Whose Voices are Represented in Congress, ASSOCIATED PRESS-
NORC CTR. PUB. AFF. RES., http://www.apnorc.org/projects/Pages/HTML%20Reports/Democrat
ic-Representation-Americans%E2%80%99-Frustration-with-Whose-Voices-are-Represented-in-
Congress.aspx (last visited Apr. 29, 2019) (“More than 6 in 10 Americans say members of
Congress have paid a lot of attention to donors or supporters, while just 3 in 10 say they have paid
attention to the majority of people who voted for them.”).
3. Jess Bravin, Conservative-Dominated Supreme Court Fulfills Nixon-Era Dream, WALL
ST. J. (Oct. 9, 2018, 11:19 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/conservative-dominated-supreme-
court-fulfills-nixon-era-dream-1539077401.
279
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religious, ethnic, or socioeconomic diversity of the population of the United
States.4 Much of the handwringing associated with supposedly deficient
representation boils down to a question of fairness: people wonder whether
it is possible to get a fair shake if their leaders do not share their
experiences, traits, or worldview. In recent years, this conception of
fairness—which relies on representatives resembling their constituencies
demographically—has been characterized disparagingly as “identity
politics,”5 but the core concept is far older than the 2016 presidential
election, the US Supreme Court’s decisions on gerrymandering, or even the
constitutional amendments which enfranchised different portions of the
population.6 To understand what representation means and why it is
important is to get at the heart of American values—liberty, equality, and
republican government—and is essential to identifying who we are and who
we want to be as a country.
There are some problematic assumptions underlying certain
conceptions of representation, which must be discussed openly in order to
nourish a healthy form of representative politics. The idea that a person
cannot represent or fairly judge those from whom he is different (racially,
socioeconomically, experientially, or otherwise) is wholly contrary to the
values of the United States. Yet proponents of this position are not
completely without merit for raising the questions; privilege, bias, and
misunderstanding are just as much a part of the American experience as the
lofty ideals of blind justice and a meritocratic elite.7 These broader
conversations are beyond the scope of this article, however, which will
principally focus on a narrow aspect of descriptive demographic
representation on state supreme courts, emphasizing rurality as the relevant
variable.
While representation has been debated extensively in the context of
executive and legislative politics,8 it has only recently begun to be
discussed in the realm of the judiciary. Activists and academics across
ideological lines have striven to show how state and federal courts at all
levels are demographically unrepresentative of the national or regional
4. Claire Hansen, 116th Congress by Party, Race, Gender, and Religion, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP. (Jan. 3, 2019, 5:36 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/politics/slideshows/116th-
congress-by-party-race-gender-and-religion.
5. Francis Fukuyama, Against Identity Politics: The New Tribalism and the Crisis of
Democracy, 97 FOREIGN AFF. 90 (2018), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/americas/2018-
08-14/against-identity-politics-tribalism-francis-fukuyama.
6. In fact, it goes back to the very founding of the United States. See JOHN PHILLIP REID,
THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION IN THE AGE OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 43–45 (1989) (see
especially the discussion on the relationship between taxation and representation).
7. Stacey Y. Abrams, John Sides, Michael Tesler, Lynn Vavreck, Jennifer A. Richeson, &
Francis Fukuyama, E Pluribus Unum?: The Fight Over Identity Politics, 98 FOREIGN AFF. 160
(2019), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2019-02-01/stacey-abrams-response-to-francis-
fukuyama-identity-politics-article (see especially Abrams).
8. See the debates about the electoral college and gerrymandering congressional districts.
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population,9 the ideological makeup of the states in which they serve,10 and
the religious makeup of the country,11 to name just a few.12 The issue of
representation in the judiciary has also cropped up with greater frequency in
day-to-day politics, including in the media reaction to the 2018 judicial
elections in Harris County, Texas (Houston),13 Chief Justice Roberts’ rare
criticism of President Trump’s comments about “Obama judges,”14 and the
succeeding criticism of Roberts’ own record in this regard.15
Representation in the judiciary is less straightforward than in a
legislative or executive context. The ideal of blind justice, the reality of the
often prohibitive costs of the legal education required in most states for
appointment or election to the bench, and the urban nature of legal
education and the legal profession generally are just some of many issues
that lend themselves to a judicial crisis of representation. This crisis is
arguably most acute in the context of urban versus rural representation,16 a
demographic factor not discussed as much as race in the context of the
judiciary, but nonetheless essential.17 If the highest courts that shape the
common law of the several states are overstocked with cultural urbanites to
the detriment of rural representation, the skew in both judicial results and
9. The two most common characteristics examined in this way are race and gender. See
Tracey E. George & Albert H. Yoon, The Gavel Gap: Who Sits in Judgment on State Courts?,
AM. CONST. SOC’Y L. & POL’Y, http://gavelgap.org/pdf/gavel-gap-report.pdf (last visited Oct. 28,
2019); Maritza Perez & Ben Hernandez-Stern, The Federal Judiciary Needs More Latino Judges,
HILL (May 24, 2018, 5:30 PM), https://thehill.com/opinion/judiciary/389288-the-federal-
judiciary-needs-more-latino-judges; Foster-Long’s Gender Diversity Survey, in 1 THE AMERICAN
BENCH: JUDGES OF THE NATION (Amanda Long ed., 29th ed. 2019). The latter also contains
detailed information on judges’ educational backgrounds but not sorted in a systematic way.
10. Brian T. Fitzpatrick, The Ideological Consequences of Selection: A Nationwide Study of
the Methods of Selecting Judges, 70 VAND. L. REV. 1729, 1732 (2017).
11. Lawrence M. Krauss, Put an Atheist on the Supreme Court, NEW YORKER (Feb. 19,
2016), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/put-an-atheist-on-the-supreme-court.
12. Although not advocating for descriptive representation per se, Justice Antonin Scalia
noted that the US Supreme Court itself is demographically unrepresentative, even as it must make
decisions that affect the entire country. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2629 (2015)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Federal Judiciary is hardly a cross-section of America. Take, for
example, this Court, which consists of only nine men and women, all of them successful lawyers
who studied at Harvard or Yale Law School. . .Not a single evangelical Christian (a group that
comprises about one quarter of Americans), or even a Protestant of any denomination. . .”)
(citations omitted).
13. Adeel Hassan, 17 Black Women Sweep to Judgeships in Texas County, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/09/us/black-female-judges-texas-election.html.
14. Adam Liptak, Chief Justice Defends Judicial Independence After Trump Attacks ‘Obama
Judge,’ N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/21/us/politics/trump-
chief-justice-roberts-rebuke.html.
15. Garrett Epps, Will John Roberts Block the Triumph of Legal Conservatism?, ATLANTIC
(Apr. 2, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/04/john-roberts-isnt-really-moder
ate/586273 (quoting a memo in which a younger Roberts wrote disparagingly about the possibility
of a “Carter-appointed judge” overruling a Reagan appointee to the federal bench).
16. See infra § III.
17. See, e.g., George & Yoon, supra note 9.
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public perception of the courts will lead to a loss of legitimacy as well as
decisions that fail to consider the cultural background of litigants.
One of the most critical—yet undervalued—forms of representation is
that of rural residents on state supreme courts.18 Using the US Census
Bureau’s definition of rurality, just under 20 percent of US citizens reside in
rural areas, which is a sizeable and important number.19 Yet the legal
profession in the United States today is principally an urban one—only 2
percent of small law practices in the United States are located in rural
areas.20 The rural and urban populations of this country share great mutual
distrust and no shortage of animosity.21 Ensuring that some of the justices
on a state’s supreme court come from rural as well as urban backgrounds
will make the decisions of the courts more legitimate and enable them to
make better culturally informed decisions.
The law must apply equally to Americans from both urban and rural
areas, yet there is some question as to whether this is possible if all the
members of a state’s high court hail from its cities. Can these urbanites
understand the culture of the “country”? What about the customs, traditions,
and values of the parties arguing before them? Is it possible to properly
represent the rural worldview on state supreme courts without some
mechanism for selecting justices from rural backgrounds? This paper aims
to explore the idea of a descriptively representative judiciary, delve into
why rurality matters as a descriptive factor, and examine districts as a
mechanism to secure rural judicial representation. In doing so, it should
shed some light on one of the most important and under-discussed issues
18. A note here is important: there are several states which use districts at the intermediate
level but not the supreme court level (Arizona, Arkansas, California, Florida, Indiana, Michigan,
Minnesota (a hybrid of districts aligned with the congressional districts and at-large seats),
Missouri, New York, Ohio, Texas (only for civil court), Vermont (election is statewide, but
candidates come from districts), Washington, and Wisconsin). Eight states currently utilize
districts for supreme court selection: Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi,
Nebraska, Oklahoma, and South Dakota. Methods of Judicial Selection, NAT’L CTR. ST. CTS.,
http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/methods/selection_of_judges.cfm (last visited
Apr. 30, 2019). This paper, however, focuses on state supreme courts without considering
intermediate courts. The reason for this is that though the design of such intermediate systems can
be instructive, ultimately, such systems maintain a “statewide safeguard” against regionalism in
the form of a presumptive geographically unrepresentative high court. This paper is concerned
with increasing representation at the highest level of state courts, and as such, intermediate courts
fall outside the purview.
19. Michael Ratcliffe, Charlynn Burd, Kelly Holder & Alison Fields, Defining Rural at the
U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Dec. 2016), https://www.census.gov/content/dam/
Census/library/publications/2016/acs/acsgeo-1.pdf.
20. Lisa R. Pruitt, Amanda L. Kool, Lauren Sudeall, Michele Statz, Danielle M. Conway &
Hannah Haksgaard, Legal Deserts: A Multi-State Perspective on Rural Access to Justice, 13
HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 15, 22 (2018).
21. Shayndi Raice & Janet Adamy, Big Cities’ Success Reflects Deepening Urban-Rural
Divide, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 14, 2018, 6:48 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/big-cities-success-
reflects-deepening-urban-rural-divide-1542239287.
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facing the United States today and address a critical gap in the literature on
descriptive judicial representation.
I. WHY STATE SUPREME COURTS?
State supreme courts have incredible power to interpret state law. For
many issues, they act as the final arbiters, with rulings standing beyond
appeal.22 Who occupies these benches matters tremendously for how the
law is interpreted. While states vary in how they select those who sit on
their high courts, all of the current state supreme court justices are lawyers,
and forty-eight states explicitly require justices to be lawyers.23 However,
even within the profession, there exists a wide enough diversity that appro-
priate representation can still be achieved with the right policies and proce-
dures. By focusing on the recruitment of rural candidates for appointment
or election, states can solve their rural judicial representation crisis.
Even as judges must represent the law and justice, they nonetheless
ought also to be representative of the people they judge. The French philo-
sophe, Baron de Montesquieu argued that judges ought to be “of the same
rank as the accused, or, in other words, his peers.”24 This will tend to in-
crease the public’s confidence in the courts, which is critical to their legiti-
macy, and has been described as “[a]n essential condition for realizing the
judicial role.”25 Yet it is important to avoid pretending that the judiciary is
not political.26 Such a legal fiction produces courts out of step with the
populace, and laws unrepresentative of the intention of the legislature. By
virtue of their role of interpreting the law—made by politicians—judges
themselves act as political figures.
Judges are selected in four basic ways: appointment by governors or
legislatures, partisan election, nonpartisan election, and “merit” selection by
commission.27 There are benefits and drawbacks to each of these various
systems; this paper, however, will focus not on any one method, but on a
framework into which any of these methods may be inserted. Dividing a
state into geographical districts from which state supreme court justices
22. SALMON A. SHOMADE, DECISION MAKING AND CONTROVERSIES IN STATE SUPREME
COURTS xvii–xviii (2018).
23. Adam Bonica & Maya Sen, The Politics of Selecting the Bench from the Bar: The Legal
Profession and Partisan Incentives to Introduce Ideology into Judicial Selection, 60 J.L. & ECON.
559, 561 (2017).
24. BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 153 (Thomas Nugent trans., Hafner
Pub. Co. 1949) (1748).
25. AHARON BARAK, THE JUDGE IN A DEMOCRACY 109 (2006).
26. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DAVID SCHKADE, LISA M. ELLMAN & ANDRES SAWICKI, ARE JUDGES
POLITICAL? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 147 (2006) (“No reasonable
person seriously doubts that ideology, understood as moral and political commitments of various
sorts, helps to explain judicial votes.”). This is not to take a cynical view, but to recognize that
judges are humans, and their reading of the law is colored by their cultures and backgrounds,
including where and how they were raised.
27. Fitzpatrick, supra note 10, at 1729–30.
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may be appointed or elected will inherently increase geographic diversity
on the high court’s bench—especially where it is dominated by justices
from a major metropolitan area in the state. With the right districting sys-
tem, the courts could increase their rural representation and thus better serve
an otherwise marginalized population.
II. DESCRIPTIVE REPRESENTATION AND COURTS
It matters whether judges are demographically representative of the
populations they serve. On the one hand, it can be accurately said that just
decisions may be reached irrespective of the judges’ characteristics.28 On
the other, however, symbols matter; demographically representative judges
lend the courts legitimacy and can better reflect the values of the communi-
ties.29 Whether reflecting the values of the community is a valid judicial
goal is a complex question, but it can be answered in the affirmative insofar
as the laws are made by the peoples’ representatives, so only a judiciary
reflective of the people could interpret those laws in an authentically demo-
cratic way.
Descriptive representation refers to the extent to which a representative
resembles the characteristics of those he represents—that is, “one person
represents another by being sufficiently like him.”30 Rather than “acting
for” his constituents, this type of representative “stands for” them by virtue
of his resemblance of them.31 The crux of the argument is that in resem-
bling constituents, a representative lends the appearance of legitimacy to his
institution, while simultaneously being more likely to substantively re-
present them than another would-be representative who lacks the relevant
characteristics.32 This dual function of substance and symbolism that some
argue for is important to understand because it is ultimately the foundation
28. For example, a unanimous court of white men decided Brown v. Board of Education of
Topeka, Shawnee County, Kansas, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). However, this can be countered by noting
that a court of the same racial and gender makeup decided Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393
(1857) and Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
29. Jane Mansbridge, Should Blacks Represent Blacks and Women Represent Women? A
Contingent “Yes,” 61 J. POL. 628, 648–52 (1999) [hereinafter Mansbridge, Should Blacks Re-
present Blacks and Women Represent Women?] (while Mansbridge’s discussion in this section is
on legislative descriptive representation, her points are readily applicable to the judiciary as well).
30. A. Phillips Griffiths & Richard Wollheim, Symposium: How Can One Person Represent
Another?, 34 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y, SUPPLEMENTARY VOLUMES 187, 188 (1960).
31. HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 61 (1972).
32. That said, this paper will argue that substantive representation is less important than
descriptive representation in the context of the judiciary, given the dual representative function of
judges to be symbols of both the law and the litigants. The “substance,” too, can be measured in
different ways, so that insofar as judicial decision makers account for cultural factors when decid-
ing cases, they can be seen to be “substantively” representing the litigants and not merely symbol-
izing them.
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upon which so many modern assumptions of representation and identity
politics rest.33
There are six basic arguments for descriptive representation on courts:
(1) it increases the “democratic legitimacy of the judiciary;” (2) it signals
equality of opportunity for those in the represented group who aspire to
judicial office; (3) it provides encouragement and mentoring to those com-
ing up the pipeline; (4) the representative has a different perspective that
can counter bias and lead to increased fairness in the court’s decision-mak-
ing; (5) this will also happen behind the scenes, where the representative
will educate other judges; and (6) the experiences of the representative will
lead to different substantive conclusions.34 Each of these factors are valua-
ble in different ways for bolstering the legitimacy of the courts.
The majority of research on descriptive representation has focused on
gender, racial, and ethnic characteristics.35 Yet descriptive representation
“can denote not only visible characteristics, such as color of skin or gender,
but also shared experiences.”36 Likewise, while research was previously
confined to legislative institutions, there is now a growing acknowledge-
ment and expanding body of work devoted to judicial descriptive represen-
tation.37 This is critical because, for a long time, representation in the
judiciary was taken for granted—with the judicial branch viewed as a non-
representative entity by its very nature38—which contributed to an impover-
ished understanding of the judge’s role in a democratic society.
A common criticism of descriptive representation is that it is ulti-
mately less meaningful than “substantive representation.”39 While this is a
fair critique in the legislative realm, where a representative may appear to
33. See generally Mark Lilla, The End of Identity Liberalism, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/20/opinion/sunday/the-end-of-identity-liberalism.html; Jeff
Stein, Bernie Sanders: “It is Not Good Enough for Someone to Say, ‘I’m a Woman! Vote for
Me!,’” VOX (Nov. 21, 2016, 5:30 PM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2016/11/21/
13699956/sanders-clinton-democratic-party.
34. Rosemary Hunter, More than Just a Different Face? Judicial Diversity and Decision-
Making, 68 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 119, 123–24 (2015).
35. See, e.g., Michele L. Swers & Stella M. Rouse, Descriptive Representation: Understand-
ing the Impact of Identity on Substantive Representation of Group Interests, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF THE AMERICAN CONGRESS 241 (George C. Edwards III, Frances E. Lee & Eric
Schickler eds., 2011).
36. Mansbridge, supra note 29, at 629.
37. See, e.g., Nancy Scherer, Blacks on the Bench, 119 POL. SCI. Q. 655 (2005).
38. Bonica & Sen, supra note 23, at 560.
39. Nancy Scherer & Brett Curry, Does Descriptive Race Representation Enhance Institu-
tional Legitimacy? The Case of the U.S. Courts, 72 J. POL. 90, 91 (2010); Jane Mansbridge, What
Does a Representative Do? Descriptive Representation in Communicative Settings of Distrust,
Uncrystallized Interests, and Historically Denigrated Status, in CITIZENSHIP IN DIVERSE SOCIETIES
99, 101 (Will Kymlicka & Wayne Norman eds., 2000) [hereinafter Mansbridge, What Does a
Representative Do?]. See also DAVID LUBLIN, THE PARADOX OF REPRESENTATION: RACIAL GER-
RYMANDERING AND MINORITY INTERESTS IN CONGRESS 99–102 (1997). Although Lublin writes in
the context of legislative districting, his discussion of the relationship between descriptive and
substantive representation is relevant in the judicial context as well. Nonetheless, the judicial
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share similar characteristics to his constituency, yet vote contrary to its in-
terests, this is less of a concern in the judicial realm, where the judge acts as
what can be called a “quasi-representative.” The judge, while reflecting the
characteristics of the population on which he must pass judgment, ulti-
mately acts for something greater than the mere interests of this population.
He must symbolically represent the law, and even justice, while also de-
scriptively representing the people.40
Another criticism is that attempts at descriptive representation inevita-
bly yield to a lottery or quota system aimed at creating a representative
body that is as reflective as possible of the diversity of society.41  Accord-
ingly, the overall quality of the representatives would decline as they are
selected not merely based on skill, but on extraneous factors. In other
words, representatives are chosen not for what they can do, but for who
they are. While this is an important critique, it is ultimately countered by
advocating not for “microcosmic” representation, but for a “selective” form
of descriptive representation.42 A concrete quota system of the type neces-
sary to achieve microcosmic descriptive representation is antithetical to the
American ethos.43
Another criticism of descriptive representation is its tendency toward
essentialism.44 It is particularly concerning when a representative is per-
ceived to be capable only of representing that group of which he is a mem-
ber, and by extension—and in the case of the judiciary—having no right to
judge anyone outside of his group. This can be curbed, however, by focus-
context is different enough that his conclusions are less well-grounded here than in the legislative
context.
40. PITKIN, supra note 31, at 117–18 (describing representation from a judicial standpoint as
“the substance, or content, or guiding principle of action”). Pitkin discusses the judge as “symboli-
cally” representing “justice” or “the law.” The legitimacy of the courts depends on this being true
in a narrow sense or on the basis of popular perception, yet it is also clear that judges are influ-
enced by, and represent other actors or ideas in the process of also representing these more ab-
stract or grand principles. Judges do not exist in a vacuum, and their culture and identity
tremendously shape their judicial philosophies in rich and varied ways.
41. Mansbridge, supra note 29, at 631.
42. Id. at 632 (In this framework, “institutional design gives selected groups greater descrip-
tive representation than they would achieve in existing electoral systems in order to bring the
proportions of those groups . . . closer to their percentages in the population.”).
43. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 288–89 (1978). Discussions of
descriptive representation inevitably draw parallels to those of affirmative action in higher educa-
tion. Many of the rationales are the same, as are the criticisms. See also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 306, 332 (2003) (“In order to cultivate a set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of the
citizenry, it is necessary that the path to leadership be visibly open to talented and qualified indi-
viduals of every race and ethnicity. All members of our heterogeneous society must have confi-
dence in the openness and integrity of the educational institutions that provide this training.”).
Replace “educational institutions” with government, and “training” with representation, and the
issues are the same.
44. Mansbridge, What Does a Representative Do?, supra note 39, at 108 (“Essentialism in-
volves assuming a single or essential trait, or nature, that binds every member of a descriptive
group together, giving them common interests that, in the most extreme versions of the idea,
transcend the interests that divide them.”).
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ing on the mechanism of selection, attempting to understand its effects, and
altering it to increase the proportionality of representatives to the population
they represent. If this is done in a mechanical and just way, then it should
dispel any suspicion of minority selection as undeserved affirmative action,
and instead, simply remove barriers toward a more natural selection of
representatives.45
A selective system can correct for the degree of adverse selection in-
herent in a given pool, adjusting the odds of who becomes a representa-
tive.46 Voters may then select representatives that share their values,
culture, or background and may “gyroscopically” represent them.47 Rather
than utilizing a top-down approach and selecting judges from particular
groups, which will lend the appearance of impropriety and unfairness to the
section,48 districting selects the selectors (in an electoral model) and/or the
pool of selectees (in an appointment model) in a less direct way.
This paper proposes a hybrid symbolic view of judicial representation,
supplemented with a realist interpretation of judicial action.49 Using this
lens, as many of the more recent studies in this area have done, it is clear
that whether judges “look like,” or share characteristics with those who
stand before the bench, is important to both the legitimacy of their deci-
sions50 and to the types of decisions made.51 Descriptive representation in
the judicial branch will necessarily look different from the same type of
representation in legislative bodies—particularly given the extra qualifica-
tions judges are required to meet in most states, as well as the fact that there
is no uniformity in election or appointment as a selection strategy, and
judges must represent both the people and the law.
Numerous studies have shown that while increased descriptive repre-
sentation leads to increased perception of legitimacy, “ideological congru-
45. Mansbridge, supra note 29, at 632.
46. Id.
47. Jane Mansbridge, Rethinking Representation, 97 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 515, 522 (2003).
48. Scherer & Curry, supra note 39, at 101–02. In this study, the authors found that white
diffuse support for courts declined when blacks were better represented on the bench. Id. While it
was a small study which one of the authors has cautioned is “not generalizable to the population
writ large,” it is nonetheless an important finding that should be studied further and in greater
depth, key as it is to judicial legitimacy. Nancy Scherer, Diversifying the Federal Bench: Is Uni-
versal Legitimacy for the U.S. Justice System Possible?, 105 NW. L. REV. 587, 630, n.220 (2011).
49. Brian Leiter, American Legal Realism, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND
LEGAL THEORY 249, 249 (Dennis Patterson ed., 2d ed., 2010) (noting that under a legal realist
approach, it is understood that “judges are influenced by more than legal rules; judges and lawyers
openly consider the policy or political implications of legal rules and decisions; law texts now
routinely consider the economic, political, and historical context of judicial decisions.”).
50. Scherer & Curry, supra note 39, at 101.
51. See Adam N. Glynn & Maya Sen, Identifying Judicial Empathy: Does Having Daughters
Cause Judges to Rule for Women’s Issues?, 59 AM. J. POL. SCI. 37, 38–39, 52–53 (2015); Scherer,
supra note 37, at 669–70.
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ence” between a judge and the population remains an important factor.52 It
is likewise clear that while descriptive representation plays a real role in the
level of legitimacy people ascribe to their institutions, there is widespread
understanding that no single descriptively representative member of a given
body will substantially increase public trust in that body.53 It takes more.
Only by radically reshaping the systems by which high court judges are
appointed will descriptive representation lead to a meaningful increase in
institutional trust in the competence of those bodies.
III. RURALITY MATTERS
While most analysis of descriptive representation has to do with race
and gender, rurality, too, needs to be taken into consideration when select-
ing state supreme court justices.54 Rurality is distinguishable from race and
gender as a variable in terms of descriptive representation. While race and
gender are innate characteristics, rurality reflects an intergenerational
choice for a particular way of life, culture, and value system deeply en-
twined with the American experience. By categorizing people according to
characteristics they cannot control, we inherently move away from the
American value of equality. By marginalizing people who have chosen to
live in rural areas, we as a society make value judgments about how people
ought to live, which itself is not conducive to equality.
A person may belong to a racial or gender group, yet not identify with
any of the traditional markers associated with that group; he may prefer not
to identify as a member of that group at all, but would be labelled regardless
if he had certain external characteristics. If he were picked as a “representa-
tive” of that group, then despite his lending legitimacy to the institution by
way of contributing to racial diversity, he would in no way contribute to the
substantive representation of the group. Rurality, on the other hand, is a
variable which crosses racial, gender, socioeconomic, and educational lines,
and is fundamentally a voluntary marker of identity. In a descriptive repre-
sentation context, rather than tending toward quotas based on immutable
characteristics with dubious claims to substantive representation, rurality
52. Scherer & Curry, supra note 39, at 102 (“[B]oth blacks and whites view descriptive racial
representation not in isolation, but rather, filtered through an ideological lens.”); Alex Badas &
Katelyn E. Stauffer, Someone Like Me: Descriptive Representation and Support for Supreme
Court Nominees, 71 POL. RES. Q. 127, 136 (2018); Jaclyn Kaslovsky, Jon C. Rogowski & Andrew
R. Stone, Descriptive Representation, Public Opinion, and the Courts 2 (Apr. 19, 2018) (unpub-
lished working paper), https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/rogowski/files/kaslovsky-rogowski-stone
.pdf.
53. Claudine Gay, Spirals of Trust? The Effect of Descriptive Representation on the Rela-
tionship between Citizens and Their Government, 46 AM. J. POL. SCI. 717, 731 (2002); See Kas-
lovsky, Rogowski & Stone, supra note 52, at 29.
54. It is important to note that this paper does not present a call per se to redesign judicial
selection systems for the sake of descriptive rural representation, but rather notes that if descrip-
tive representation is to be taken into account in judicial selection, then rurality as a variable must
not be ignored.
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offers a fairly consistent variable that can lead to both legitimacy and sub-
stantive representation for a large, otherwise marginalized and misunder-
stood population of Americans.
The United States was long a predominantly rural country; it was only
in 1920 that the number of people living in urban areas surpassed those in
rural.55 Yet a majority of US counties remain rural even as the country’s
population is increasingly urban.56 Despite different measures and defini-
tions57 to calculate with greater precision what constitutes rurality, ulti-
mately rurality can be used to describe any place that is not a city.58 Given
the concentration of wealth—and thus power—found in cities, there has
been a strong strain of moralistic anti-urbanism throughout US history, go-
ing back at least to Thomas Jefferson, if not further.59 The feeling is mutual,
as urbanites often mistrust the motives and ideas of rural-dwelling Ameri-
cans.60 Without adequate cultural and social capital like media outlets and
major institutions, rural-dwelling Americans are often misunderstood, mis-
represented, and maligned by their urban counterparts.61
A focus on increasing rural representation may seem strange, given the
popular mantra that rural voters in fact have an unnatural advantage over
urban ones.62 Constructions like the US Senate with its two senators per
state, regardless of population, or the Electoral College, which incorporates
those senators as votes for president, mean that these built-in advantages are
real.63 Yet it is important to distinguish that these advantages come at the
55. Urban and Rural Areas, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (July 18, 2017), https://www.census.gov/
history/www/programs/geography/urban_and_rural_areas.html.
56. Richard Florida, The Divides Within, and Between, Urban and Rural America, CITYLAB
(Sept. 18, 2018), https://www.citylab.com/life/2018/09/the-divides-within-and-between-urban-
and-rural-america/569749.
57. What is Rural?, U.S. DEPT. AGRIC. ECON. RES. SERV., https://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/
rural-economy-population/rural-classifications/what-is-rural (last updated Apr. 9, 2019) (“Some-
times population density is the defining concern, in other cases it is geographic isolation . . . .
Population thresholds used to differentiate rural and urban communities range from 2,500 up to
50,000, depending on the definition.”).
58. Urban and Rural Areas, supra note 55.
59. STEVEN CONN, AMERICANS AGAINST THE CITY: ANTI-URBANISM IN THE TWENTIETH CEN-
TURY 11–12 (2014).
60. Jose A. Del Real & Scott Clement, Rural Divide, WASH. POST (June 17, 2017), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2017/national/rural-america/.
61. Katherine J. Cramer, The Great American Fallout: How Small Towns Came to Resent
Cities, GUARDIAN (June 19, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2017/jun/19/americas-
great-fallout-rural-areas-resent-cities-republican-democrat.
62. See, e.g., Emily Badger, As American as Apple Pie? The Rural Vote’s Disproportionate
Slice of Power, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/21/upshot/as-
american-as-apple-pie-the-rural-votes-disproportionate-slice-of-power.html; See generally
JONATHAN A. RODDEN, WHY CITIES LOSE: THE DEEP ROOTS OF THE URBAN-RURAL POLITICAL
DIVIDE (2019).
63. Nestor M. Davidson & Paul A. Diller, A City-Suburban Coalition Can’t Win While the
System Favors Rural Voters, CITYLAB (Nov. 30, 2018), https://www.citylab.com/perspective/
2018/11/representation-rahm-emanuel-urban-rural-suburban-election/577051.
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federal level rather than state, as state level voting for representatives is
more directly democratic than at the federal level.64
States often have disproportionate balances of power, with the political
and cultural centers of the state dominating life to the detriment of the rural
areas.65 While trial courts tend to be divided into districts, state supreme
courts are most often chosen statewide. When lawyers are concentrated in
urban areas, as they often are, the pool of lawyers available to fill spots on a
state’s high court are heavily skewed toward urbanites.66 This leads to
courts comprised of individuals who often do not understand rural culture
or share rural political and social sentiments. This, in turn, produces a dis-
connect between litigants and judges that can cost courts not only legiti-
macy but nuanced and just decisions.
Geographic location—and consequently, rurality or urbanity—is a tre-
mendous predictor of ideology among lawyers.67 “Areal” background af-
fects the way judges view their roles—as either law interpreters or
lawmakers—with rural judges strongly viewing themselves as the former.68
If the court of a conservative state is comprised of lawyers from its liberal
urban centers (who themselves are already members of a generally liberal
profession),69 this can produce problems, including judges overstepping
their boundaries to misrepresent the intentions of legislators when interpret-
ing the law.70 After all, “the judge must reflect the beliefs of society, even if
64. U.S. Supreme Court cases have seen to this where it may not have been the case prior to
the second half of the twentieth century. In Gray v. Sanders, the Court disestablished weighted
voting by counties and declared famously that, “The conception of political equality from the
Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and
Nineteenth Amendments can mean only one thing—one person, one vote.” 372 U.S. 368, 381
(1963). The Court soon after ruled out U.S. Senate-style districts for state legislatures, stating, “the
Equal Protection Clause requires that the seats in both houses of a bicameral state legislature must
be apportioned on a population basis,” and more memorably, “Legislators represent people, not
trees or acres.” Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568, 562 (1964).
65. Ethan Bronner, No Lawyer for Miles, So One Rural State Offers Pay, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
8, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/09/us/subsidy-seen-as-a-way-to-fill-a-need-for-rural-
lawyers.html (“In South Dakota, 65 percent of the lawyers live in four urban areas. In Georgia, 70
percent are in the Atlanta area. In Arizona, 94 percent are in the two largest counties, and in
Texas, 83 percent are around Houston, Dallas, Austin and San Antonio.”).
66. Pruitt, et al., supra note 20, at 84 (discussing this problem specifically in the context of
Northeastern Minnesota and Northern Wisconsin).
67. Adam Bonica, Adam S. Chilton & Maya Sen, The Political Ideologies of American Law-
yers, 8 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 277, 297–98 (2016) (“[R]egression[] results revealed that the congres-
sional district where an attorney lives is an extremely important predictor of that lawyer’s
ideology.”). It is important however not to use rural as a byword for political conservatism, as this
would diminish the cultural richness and diversity present in rural America and reflected in its
citizens and consequently judicial officers.
68. John T. Wold, Political Orientations, Social Backgrounds, and Role Perceptions of State
Supreme Court Judges, 27 W. POL. Q. 239, 242–44 (1974). “Areal” refers to the geographic
distribution from which the judges hail.
69. Bonica, Chilton & Sen, supra note 67, at 292.
70. Richard Bellamy & Cristina E. Parau, Introduction: Democracy, Courts and the Dilem-
mas of Representation, 49 J. REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 255, 261 (2013) (“Judges might be
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these are not the judge’s own beliefs.”71 Contrary behavior delegitimizes
the courts in the eyes of the public, and can be exploited by politicians for
short-term political gain to the detriment of the institution.72
Yet irrespective of political differences, the greatest divide between
rural and urban America is cultural: religion, values, traditions, and
worldviews vary widely between rural and urban Americans.73 These dif-
ferences can translate into misunderstandings, especially in the context of
litigation.74 Culture affects all judges. Justice Cardozo recognized this, say-
ing that judges are affected by “forces which they do not recognize and
cannot name . . . inherited instincts, traditional beliefs, acquired convictions
. . . which, when reasons are nicely balanced, must determine where choice
shall fall.”75 Increased representation by judges from rural backgrounds—in
whatever form its implementation occurred—would do more than anything
else to correct this issue in the context of the urban-rural divide.
IV. DISTRICTS AS A SOLUTION TO DESCRIPTIVE RURAL REPRESENTATION
ON STATE SUPREME COURTS
Having established the importance of descriptive representation to the
institutional legitimacy of courts and substantive representation, and having
shown that rurality is a unique and neglected characteristic for judges, we
will next discuss a potential solution. Districts have long been used to en-
sure descriptive areal representation. Institutions ranging from the US Con-
gress to the federal court system, to several state supreme and appellate
courts, to nearly all state trial courts, utilize some form of districting. The
reasons for districting have historically ranged from the difficulty of
lengthy travelling to voting booths, to ensuring that certain groups get the
opportunity for descriptive representation. While districting does not come
without its challenges, when properly implemented, it can serve to correct
the processes that maintain an unrepresentative judiciary.
thought to have betrayed the trust placed in them when their decisions reflect their own prefer-
ences rather than those of the elected representatives who crafted the laws, constitutions or con-
ventions in question.”).
71. BARAK, supra note 25, at 95.
72. Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Taking Judicial Legitimacy Seriously, 93 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 505,
508–10 (2018).
73. See Del Real & Clement, supra note 60.
74. Unfortunately, there is a dearth of data dealing with urban-rural cultural differences in the
context of litigation.
75. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 12 (1921). For an exam-
ination of some of the misunderstandings that can arise in situations where judges lack cultural
competence, see Masua Sagiv, Cultural Bias in Judicial Decision Making, 35 B.C. J.L. & SOC.
JUST. 229 (2015).
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Eight states have adopted and enshrined into their constitutions a form
of districting for determining state supreme court justices.76 Regardless of
the method of appointment in each state—partisan or nonpartisan election,
appointment, or merit selection—the justices in these states are not selected
statewide, but rather from particular districts within the state. This ensures a
broad geographic distribution of justices, which increases rural representa-
tion in ways healthy for the functioning of state supreme courts as just arbi-
ters for all of the citizens of their states.
Such a system presents a number of questions, including how districts
are drawn, why the systems were adopted, whether they do, in fact, mean-
ingfully increase rural representation on the bench, and whether their trans-
lation to other states might serve this same purpose. The purpose of this
section is to explore these and other questions, and to show that such sys-
tems are in fact boons for well-functioning, representative, republican state
supreme courts. By being representative of its geographic distribution and
cultures, the high court of a state ensures both justice and the public percep-
tion of such.
The most obvious place to look at districts is not the most instructive,
but can still be helpful as a theoretical model in terms of conceptualizing
some of the methods, benefits, and shortcomings of a district system. The
US Congress is a large scale district-based system that features rural and
urban districts and attempts broadly to be descriptively representative. Be-
ing that this body is legislative, however, it lacks the additional requirement
that judges have to be symbolically representative of the law, and is thus a
poor practical model for our purposes.
United States federal courts, however, provide a ready-made example
of descriptive representation on a geographic basis. Their districts are at
least contiguous within state boundaries, if not subdivided further within
those boundaries.77 This ensures that each state has at least one district
court, regardless of its population—similar to the US House of Representa-
tives and Senate. And the law requires that “[e]ach district judge, except in
the District of Columbia, the Southern District of New York, and the East-
ern District of New York, shall reside in the district or one of the districts
for which he is appointed.”78 While there is no specific provision for judges
to reside in their districts prior to appointment, it is custom that this be
considered in the appointment process.79 Interestingly, the Circuit Courts of
76. Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Nebraska, Oklahoma, and South
Dakota. See Methods of Judicial Selection, NAT’L CTR. ST. CTS., http://www.judicialselection.us/
judicial_selection/methods/selection_of_judges.cfm (last visited Apr. 30, 2019).
77. MITCHEL A. SOLLENBERGER, JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS AND DEMOCRATIC CONTROLS 53
(2011).
78. 28 U.S.C. § 134(b) (2018).
79. Denis Steven Rutkus, The Appointment Process for U.S. Circuit and District Court
Nominations: An Overview, CONG. RES. SERV. 8 (June 17, 2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/
R43762.pdf.
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Appeals do specify residence as a factor in appointment: “Except in the
District of Columbia, each circuit judge shall be a resident of the circuit for
which appointed at the time of his appointment and thereafter while in ac-
tive service.”80
Congress, in creating the Article III courts, clearly accounted for the
importance of state residence in judicial legitimacy and decision-making.81
In fact, this was explicit from the beginning: “colonists began to believe
that the individuals who represent their communities in government should
know and understand the interests of the people.”82 This would only come
if the representatives lived among the people. From this type of descriptive
areal representation at the federal level, it is only a small step to enact simi-
lar districting measures to ensure descriptive rural representation on state
supreme courts. Congress’s creation of Article III courts shows that these
methods need not be constitutionally enacted, but could be legislative or
customary in nature. In any case, it matters less how representation occurs,
than that it does in fact occur. That said, it should be noted that legitimacy
is key, and it is important that the decision makers adopt a process that does
not lend the appearance of impropriety or favoring “groups,” while none-
theless attempting to selectively implement descriptive representation.83
States that already use districts for their supreme courts are also, of
course, instructive.84 Although no two systems are the same and each
state’s framework is reflective of the historical circumstances that precipi-
tated the district system’s formation, each, in some way, was designed to
decentralize the power of urban factions in the supreme court and to in-
crease geographic representation. Rather than deep-diving into the constitu-
tions of each state to have adopted supreme court districts, it is better to
briefly describe some of the motivations of a few of these states.
The first state to adopt supreme court districting was Mississippi,
which did so in 1817. This is interesting because the initial districting plan
was heavily skewed so as to draw nearly all of the justices from the then-
state capital Natchez and its surrounding area85—demonstrating that dis-
tricting can actually be wielded against rural representation and is thus in
80. 28 U.S.C. § 44(c) (2018) (emphasis added); Likewise, Courts of Appeals must have rep-
resentatives from each state within the circuit, which has resulted in the informal practice of
holding seats for judges from a given state (e.g., a “Missouri seat” or an “Ohio seat”). “State
Representation” in Appointments to Federal Circuit Courts, CONG. RES. SERV. Summary (Mar.
30, 2011), https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20110330_RS22510_60c01f3f8a90b5e7734450f
0c095411c39bfdcde.pdf.
81. J. WOODFORD HOWARD, COURTS OF APPEALS IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM: A
STUDY OF THE SECOND, FIFTH, AND DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUITS 8 (1981) (“[N]o two Courts
of Appeals are alike. Their business tends to reflect the characteristics of each region.”).
82. SOLLENBERGER, supra note 77, at 52.
83. Scherer, supra note 48, at 628–30.
84. There are eight such states. Methods of Judicial Selection, supra note 18.
85. JED HANDELSMAN SHUGERMAN, THE PEOPLE’S COURTS: PURSUING JUDICIAL INDEPEN-
DENCE IN AMERICA 66 (2012).
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\16-2\UST206.txt unknown Seq: 16  2-APR-20 12:18
294 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 16:2
itself merely a value-neutral framework for judicial selection. This geo-
graphically unrepresentative setup would not long stand, and in 1832, Mis-
sissippi held a constitutional convention, which redrew the supreme court
districts to better represent the state’s rural citizens.86 This effort was suc-
cessful in wresting control of the state’s judiciary from the powerful
“Natchez Aristocrats.”87 Mississippi indeed saw a shift in power and has
retained the system today.88
Other states followed suit, and each time, questions of representation,
balance of power, and decentralization soon emerged. In Kentucky, rural
delegates embraced districts as a means to break the disproportionate and
unrepresentative hold that urban parties had on the judiciary.89 In Illinois,
proponents of districting found a creative compromise, such that the most
populous county would elect three supreme court districts, while the other
four would be elected from equal sized districts comprising the rest of the
state.90 Nebraska, too, opted for a different system, where the chief justice
is selected at-large, while the other justices are picked from districts.91
These examples show simply that districts need not be a standard system
across states, but may be adapted and modified to meet the needs and re-
flect the values of the state adopting.
Yet there are ample problems in establishing such a system today—or
even reforming those existing.92 For example, how do we define where
someone is from? Many people move as children, then for college, and in
the cases of our justices, possibly for law school and a career as well. Does
it count more where the justice was born, where he grew up, or where he
now lives? This is an important question beyond the scope of this paper.
That said, there is some evidence that city residents with rural backgrounds
86. G. ALAN TARR, WITHOUT FEAR OR FAVOR: JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND JUDICIAL AC-
COUNTABILITY IN THE STATES 42 (2012). Interestingly, Mississippi’s 1832 constitution also made
it the first state to institute elections for all levels of its courts, including the supreme court.
87. SHUGERMAN, supra note 85, at 57.
88. Interestingly, Mississippi also uses its three supreme court districts to select members of
the Mississippi Board of Trustees of State Institutions of Higher Learning, which governs higher
education in the state. Nicole S. Poulin, State Education Finance and Governance Profile: Missis-
sippi, 85 PEABODY J. EDUC. 80, 81 (2010).
89. TARR, supra note 86, at 50.
90. ILL. CONST. art. VI, §§ 2–3; the initial compromise, which survives in this modified
form, was reached in 1848. JANET CORNELIUS, A HISTORY OF CONSTITUTION MAKING IN ILLINOIS
26 (1969).
91. NEB. CONST. art. V, § 5.
92. In the first half of 2019, Oklahoma experienced a fierce debate over whether to redraw its
own supreme court districts to be more reflective of the way the population has changed since the
first nine districts were established in 1967. See Chris Casteel, Proposed Supreme Court District
Changes Could Mean More Urban Justices, OKLAHOMAN (Mar. 17, 2019), https://oklahoman
.com/article/5625910/proposed-supreme-court-district-changes-could-mean-more-urban-justices;
Ultimately the changes were approved and the new districts went into effect in early 2020. See
2019 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 154. This is an example of how districts can be adapted to reflect the
changing values of the state while still maintaining its traditions and preserving rural
representation.
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“tend to retain rural attitudes and behavior characteristics, size of commu-
nity of origin being a stronger predictor of some attitudes than the size of
community of current residence.”93 Regardless, it is a question to be studied
moving forward. While there is no perfect solution to the problem of “car-
petbaggers,” who might opt to move into a rural district to better their
chances of judicial selection, given the distinctiveness of rural culture and
the particularity of place which a district system necessitates, it is fair to
trust the voters or appointers to make a good faith choice of justices for
which they will be held accountable depending on the justice picked. If the
purpose of a district system is to increase descriptive rural representation, it
is reasonable that the appointments will reflect the purpose.
Another issue with districts in an elective system is that, while citizens
(and thus litigants) have a strong say in who one of the justices is, they have
no say in the majority of the court which will hear their case.94 This is a
valid point, but it is important to note that citizens need not have any say in
who occupies the state supreme court bench. That does not mean the su-
preme court ought not to be descriptively representative of the citizens;
rather, it means that the identity of the judges who make the decisions ulti-
mately matters less to the legitimacy of the court than the fact that the deci-
sion-makers have been selected with reference to factors such as descriptive
representation. Indeed there is also at least anecdotal evidence that sitting
on the bench with—and thus getting to know very well—justices from di-
verse backgrounds can impact judicial decision-making.95
V. CONCLUSION
There are many questions surrounding districting as a means to in-
crease descriptive rural representation on state supreme courts. Chief among
these questions is whether districting has, in fact, effectively increased such
representation where it has been tried. Simply put, the data has not yet been
collected.96 Additional questions include whether constitutional changes are
necessary to effectuate districting, or whether a more informal mechanism
could be used. Likewise, what influence or deference, if any, do justices
receive from their peers in cases that originate in their home district? Is this
93. Norval D. Glenn & Lester Hill, Jr., Rural-Urban Differences in Attitudes and Behavior in
the United States, 429 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 36, 36 (1977).
94. TARR, supra note 86, at 51.
95. See, e.g. Sandra Day O’Connor, Thurgood Marshall: The Influence of a Raconteur, 44
STAN. L. REV. 1217 (1992) (Reflecting on the influence of her colleague on the bench Justice
Marshall, Justice O’Connor writes, “At oral arguments and conference meetings, in opinions and
dissents, Justice Marshall imparted not only his legal acumen but also his life experiences, con-
stantly pushing and prodding us to respond not only to the persuasiveness of legal argument but
also to the power of moral truth.”).
96. Studies of the type that could collect this data have already been conducted using other
variables, like race and gender, but rurality has not been critically examined. See George & Yoon,
supra note 9.
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problematic or to be encouraged, as courts look to bolster legitimacy? This
will be important to answer moving forward, but there is a gap in the litera-
ture, which so often focuses narrowly on type of judicial selection (i.e. elec-
tion, appointment, or selection) over the framework in which the selection
is made.
As the U.S. becomes more urban, it is important not to lose touch with
our roots as a rural country, nor to marginalize those who have maintained
those roots. By ensuring descriptive representation for rural Americans, we
can potentially increase the courts’ legitimacy in the eyes of rural Ameri-
cans, and likely also increase substantive fairness through high court deci-
sions which incorporate sensitivity toward rural culture and customs.
Whether rural representation on state supreme courts occurs through a dis-
tricting model or utilizes another mechanism is to be determined as further
research is done. But by asking these questions, we can perhaps begin to
reverse the growing sense of alienation among rural communities and en-
sure both symbolic and substantive legal fairness in the state justice
systems.
